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Abstract. This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic
and Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is de-
scribed in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers’ pref-
erences. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the
maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers’ satisfaction. The solution is uniquely
characterized by four axioms collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry
and mutually comparable monotonicity in conjunction with three other funda-
mental assumptions individual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness.
The Pareto efficient solutions are characterized by the axioms scale invariance,
Pareto optimality and restricted mutually comparable monotonicity along with
the basic assumptions. The relationships of these axioms and assumptions and
their links to belief revision postulates and game theory axioms are discussed.
The framework would help us to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining
processes and would initiate a new methodology of bargaining analysis.
Keywords. Bargaining theory, belief revision, game theory
1 Introduction
As one of the most fundamental models in modern economic theory, the Nash bargain-
ing solution (Nash 1950 [1]) has been developed through the investigations in game
theory in the past five decades into a high sophisticated theory with varieties of models
and extensions, and has been extensively applied to economics, sociology, politics and
management science [2,3,4,5,6,7]. Computer Scientists and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
researchers have found it useful in modeling interactions among distributed computer
systems and autonomous software agents since early 90s [8,9,10,11]. Many applications
have been developed for the design and evaluation of high-level interaction protocols
among autonomous agents for task assignment, resource allocation, conflict resolution,
electronic trading and web services, which forms the first force of the research on au-
tomated negotiation [12,13,14,10,15].
Traditionally, a bargaining situation is abstracted as a numerical game. The game-
theoretic theory of bargaining provides a quantitative method to facilitate bargaining
analysis. Its highly abstract model allows us to directly apply the approach to computing-
related applications. Most existing work on automated negotiation is actually built up
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on game-theoretic models thanks to its well-established framework and simplicity in
implementation. However, with the advance of intelligent software agents, it has been
found that the purely quantitative approach is insufficient and sometimes is inappro-
priate to computing-related applications [16,17,18]. To demonstrate this point, let us
consider a typical example in bargaining theory.
Example 1 (Wage negotiation) A labor union bargains with the management of a firm
for a wage raise. The management claims that if the raise is granted, it will have to lay
off employees to regain the balance. The union threatens that if it is not granted, a strike
will be called1.
The modeling of the scenario in game theory requires quantifying each party’s sit-
uation with utility functions. The firm’s utility can be simply defined as the excess of
its revenue over labor costs in conjunction with the possible loss due to a strike. The
union’s utility can be extremely complicated, as “it is an old question in labor eco-
nomics”, which needs a comprehensive consideration of the levels of payment, chance
of layoff, potential alternative offers and living costs [19,20,5]. Acquiring these data
can never be an easy job for a software agent.
Bargaining is intelligent rivalry between agents, logical reasoning must play an es-
sential role in most bargaining activities. A bargaining theory should be able to identify
the logical reasoning behind bargaining. However, the language of utility has limited
expressive power. The process of quantifying a bargaining situation loses information
about bargaining reasoning. A number of factors, such as negotiation demands, conflict-
ing claims, and mutual threats, which in fact determine the outcome of a negotiation,
cannot be explicitly specified in game-theoretic models and hence are mostly ignored.
To gain an insight into bargaining reasoning, let us restate the wage negotiation
problem in logical language. On the one hand, the union demands a wage raise (raise)
and is aware of the management’s claim that if the raise is granted, a layoff may be
carried out (raise→layoff ). It is believed that a layoff will result in a number of union
members losing their jobs (layoff→ ¬jobs), which is a situation the union has to avoid
(jobs are demanded). On the other hand, the management realizes that the failure to
agree on the wage raise would lead to a strike (¬raise→strike), which will surely para-
lyze the normal production of the firm (strike→ ¬production). The management must
prevent such a situation from happening (production is demanded).
With the new description, it is easy to identify the conflicts between the negotiation
parties. Besides the direct conflicts: raise and ¬raise, there are two indirect conflicts
can be identified:
1. {raise, raise→layoff, layoff→ ¬jobs, jobs} ` ⊥;
2. {¬raise, ¬raise→strike, strike→ ¬production, production} ` ⊥.
Resolving the conflicts is actually a logical issue even though the classical propo-
sitional logic may not be sufficient to supply a solution (see a formal solution to the
problem in Section 5).
This paper aims to develop a logical framework of bargaining reasoning. A bargain-
ing situation is modeled in terms of bargainers’ belief states that specify the bargainers’
1 The description of the scenario is based on the similar examples in [16] and [7].
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negotiation items, including their beliefs, demands and threats, as well as their prefer-
ences. The negotiation items will be represented in propositional logic. The preferences
of bargainers are quantified in terms of the logical structure of bargainers’ belief states.
We propose a logical solution to the n-person bargaining situations based on bargainers’
satisfaction from the negotiation outcome. We characterize the solution with logically
represented axioms and assumptions. These axioms and assumptions draw on two dif-
ference resources: belief revision and game theory. Some of them are the multiagent
version of the AGM postulates [21,22], which specify the purely logical properties of
bargaining solutions in conflict resolving. Some are the analogue of game-theoretic
axioms [3,1], which balance the satisfaction of negotiating parties. The others are the
combination of both. These axioms specify two basic elements of bargaining reasoning:
conflict resolving and gain balancing.
We shall restrict ourselves in this paper to the axiomatic model of bargaining by
following Nash’s tradition: the cooperative model of bargaining [1,4,7]. In stead of
specifying concrete negotiation procedures, we focus on the generic properties of bar-
gaining solutions. This differentiates our work from the argumentation-based frame-
work of negotiation whereby negotiation is modeled as a procedure of argumentation
that brings about agreement in noncooperative situations [16,14]. Different from the
game-theoretic cooperative models, our framework is built up on a different level of
abstraction. We explicitly express the physical negotiation items. Rather than given, the
possible agreements are generated from our representation of bargaining situations. A
solution gives the actual contract of agreements. However, the low abstraction does not
complicate analysis and will not restrict our model to certain application domains. In
fact, the logical abstraction allows us to address even more general bargaining prob-
lems, such as non-convex domains and multi-issue bargaining. We will discuss the re-
lationships and the differences of our work with respect to the existing work in Section
6.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a few logical and
game-theoretic concepts and conventions that will be used throughout the paper. Sec-
tion 3 describes the logical representation of bargaining situations. Section 4 presents
our solution to the logically represented bargaining problems and its logical characteri-
zation. Section 5 examines our solution by using the above wage negotiation example.
Section 6 briefly summarizes the related work. Section 7 will conclude the paper with
a discussion of the issues related to the methodology that is developed in this paper.
2 Formal Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, a finite propositional languageL is assumed. The language con-
sists of a non-empty finite set of propositional variables, the standard propositional
connectives {¬,∨,∧,→,≡} and two logical constants> (true) and⊥ (false). Proposi-
tional sentences are denoted byϕ, ψ, χ, · · · . As usual, the symbol` denotes derivability
and Cn the corresponding logical closure operation, i.e., Cn(X) = {ϕ ∈ L : X ` ϕ}.
We call a set, K, of sentences to be a belief set if it is logically closed and consistent,
i.e., K = Cn(K) and K 6` ⊥.
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We also assume a few standard game-theory concepts and conventions. We shall
use <n to represent the n-dimensional Euclidean space. For any x ∈ <n, by default, xi
will indicate the ith component of x. Such a convention will also apply to any vector,
for example, a vector of sets of logical sentences.
For any x, y ∈ <n, x ≥ y means xi ≥ yi for all i. x > y means xi ≥ yi for all i but
x 6= y. x > y means xi > yi for all i.
A positive affine transformation τ = (τ1, · · · , τn) over <n means that τi(xi) =
aixi + bi for some real numbers ai and bi with ai > 0.
We say S ⊆ <n to be d-comprehensive if x ∈ S and d 6 y 6 x implies y ∈ S.
The convex hull of S, represented by conh(S), is the smallest convex set contain-
ing the set S. The comprehensive hull of S, denoted by comh(S), is the smallest 0-
comprehensive set containing S, where 0 = (0, · · · , 0) ∈ <n.
We define the weak Pareto frontier of S as: WP (S) = {x ∈ S : y > x implies y 6∈
S} and the strong Pareto frontier of S as: P (S) = {x ∈ S : y > x implies y 6∈ S}.
A bargaining game in game theory is a pair (S, d), where S ⊆ <n represents the
feasible set that can be derived from possible agreements and d ∈ S stands for the
disagreement point. In traditional bargaining theory, we assume that S is convex and
compact. A bargaining solution f is a function that assigns to each bargaining game a
unique point of S, i.e., f(S, d) ∈ S.
A bargaining solution N is the Nash solution if N(S, d) is the maximizer of the
product
∏
(xi − di) over S for any bargaining game (S, d).
A barging solutionKS is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KS-solution) ifKS(S, d)
is the maximal point of S on the segment connecting d to a(S, d), where ai(S, d) =
max{xi : x ∈ S & x ≥ d} for all i.
Nash in [1] shows that a bargaining solution f = N if and only if it satisfies the
following axioms:
– Pareto-Optimality: f(S, d) ∈ P (S).
– Symmetry: If (S, d) is a symmetric game, then fi(S, d) = fj(S, d) for all i, j.
– Scale Invariance: For any positive affine transformation τ = (τ1, · · · , τn), τ(f(S, d)) =
f(τ(S), τ(d))
– Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: IfS ′ ⊆ S and f(S, d) ∈ S′, then f(S′, d) =
f(S, d).
Kalai and Smorodinsky in [3] shows that a solution f = KS for 2-person bargain-
ing games if and only if it satisfies Pareto-Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance as
well as the following Restricted Monotonicity:
– Restricted Monotonicity: If S ′ ⊆ S and a(S′, d) = a(S, d), then f(S ′, d) ≤
f(S, d).
In spite of the large number of other solutions that have been proposed in the litera-
ture, these two solutions are most outstanding (see [7] for a comprehensive survey).
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of game theory, es-
pecially the cooperative theory of bargaining, and belief revision. For an introductory
survey of each area, see Thomson’s article [7] and Ga¨rdenfors’s article [23], respec-
tively.
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3 Logical Representation of bargaining situations
Different from the game-theoretic model of bargaining, we shall represent a bargaining
situation in terms of bargainers’ belief states, in which the negotiation items are explic-
itly described in logical statements while the preferences of the bargainers over their
bargaining items are quantified in terms of the logical structure of bargainers’ belief
states.
We assume that all negotiation items of each bargainer, including her demands,
beliefs and threats, are represented in a certain finite propositional language L. We mix
all the items together but intuitively, a demand is a term the negotiator requests the
other parties to accept (to be included in the final contract); a belief is an item she wants
to retain (to be consistent with the final contract); a threat is a statement the bargainer
intends the other parties to believe. In Example 1, for instance, raise and ¬raise are the
respective demands of the union and the management. The statements layoff→ ¬jobs
and strike→ ¬production are the respective beliefs. The statements raise→layoff and
¬raise→strike are threats made by each side, respectively2.
3.1 Entrenchment measure
In belief revision, a belief state of an agent is modeled by a belief set, indicating what
the agent believes, and an epistemic entrenchment ordering, specifying how the agent
believes its beliefs [21]. An epistemic entrenchment ordering, introduced by Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson in [24], is a qualitative measurement of the degrees in which an agent
entrenches her beliefs when a contraction or a revision operation is carried out. Zhang in
[25] extends the concept by quantifying the strengths of entrenchment. More precisely,
he assign to each statement in the underlying language a real number, interpreted as the
strength in which the agent entrenches her negotiation item that the statement stands
for. We will use the same notion to specify the belief states of a negotiating agent.
Definition 1 An entrenchment measure ρ is a function that assigns to each sentence in
the language L a real number and satisfies the following condition:
(LR) If ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ` ϕ, min{ρ(ϕ1), · · · , ρ(ϕm)} ≤ ρ(ϕ). (Logical rationality)
As the name suggests, there is an inherent connection between entrenchment mea-
sure and epistemic entrenchment ordering. In [24], an epistemic entrenchment ordering
is specified by five assumptions, named as (EE1)-(EE5). (EE4) and (EE5) describe the
properties of the ordering over a particular belief set, therefore they are not applicable to
entrenchment measure. The following observation shows that an entrenchment measure
satisfies (EE1)-(EE3).
Observation 1 An entrenchment measure ρ satisfies the following properties:
2 In many cases, it is not clear-cut what is which. For instance, jobs and production can be
viewed either as beliefs or as demands. The most important factor is how the negotiators en-
trench the items. In the sequel we will not explicitly distinguish them from each other but
simply refer them to as negotiation items.
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(EE1) If ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρ(ψ) and ρ(ψ) ≤ ρ(χ), then ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρ(χ).
(EE2) If ϕ ` ψ, then ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρ(ψ).
(EE3) For any ϕ and ψ, ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρ(ϕ ∧ ψ) or ρ(ψ) ≤ ρ(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Proof: Straightforward from Definition 1. 
It is easy to see that the logical constraint LR, introduced by Zhang and Foo in
[26], is actually the combination of (EE2) and (EE3). It implies that logically equivalent
statements have equal values of entrenchment measure. In other words, the values of en-
trenchment measure are syntactically independent. Since a finite propositional language
has only finite number of non-equivalent sentences, the value range of an entrenchment
measure is always finite.
We remark that an entrenchment measure is not a payoff or utility function. For
instance, suppose that p1 represents the demand of a seller “the price of the good is no
less than $100” and p2 denotes “the price of the good is no less than $90”. Obviously
the seller could get higher payoff from p1 than p2. However, since p1 implies p2, she
will entrench p2 more than p1, i.e., ρ(p2) > ρ(p1), because, if she fails to keep p1, she
can still bargain for p2 but the loss of p2 means the loss of both.
In Appendix, we present a procedure that generates an entrenchment measure from
a partial assignment over a non-empty subset of L provided the partial assignment sat-
isfies LR. With this procedure, an agent does not have to provide its entrenchment
measure for the whole language. She only needs to represent the preferences over her
own negotiation items. This is importance because beliefs are private information of
each bargainer. We assume that an arbitrator or an analyser is responsible to perform
the procedure.
With the notion of entrenchment measure, we can introduce a similar concept in the
belief revision literature known as “cut” in (Grove [27]) or “EE-cut” in (Rott [28]):
Cut(ρ, η) = {ϕ ∈ L : ρ(ϕ) > η} (1)
where η is a real number, referred to as the cut-off of the cut. Intuitively, Cut(ρ, η)
consists of only the sentences with the degrees of entrenchment higher than η.
The following facts are the direct consequences of LR, so we omit their proofs.
Lemma 1 Let ρ be an entrenchment measure. Then
1. ρ(⊥) ≤ ρ(ϕ) ≤ ρ(>) for any ϕ ∈ L.
2. For any η ∈ <, Cut(ρ, η) is logically closed.
3. For any η > ρ(⊥), Cut(ρ, η) is consistent.
We now extend the concept of entrenchment measure from single sentences to sets
of sentences. To avoid too many notations, we overload the function ρ with the param-
eter of a set of formulas: for any consistent set, X , of sentences, we define
ρ(X) = max{ρ(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ L \X}. (2)
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The definition is well founded because the language L is finite and at least ⊥ 6∈ X .3
The following concept is an analogue of comprehensiveness in game theory (see
Section 2). We shall refer it to as the logical comprehensiveness.
Definition 2 A set, X , of sentences is comprehensive w.r.t. ρ if ϕ ∈ X and ρ(ϕ) ≤
ρ(ψ) imply ψ ∈ X .
Interestingly, the following lemma shows that the concept of logical comprehen-
siveness coincides with the notion of “cut” in belief revision.
Lemma 2 A set of sentencesX is comprehensive w.r.t. ρ if and only ifX = Cut(ρ, ρ(X)).
Proof: The ‘if’ part is obvious. For the ‘only if’ part, let η = ρ(X) = max{ρ(ϕ) : ϕ 6∈
X}. It follows that there exists ψ 6∈ X such that ρ(ψ) = η. Meanwhile, for any ϕ ∈ L,
ρ(ϕ) > η implies ϕ ∈ X . Thus Cut(ρ, η) ⊆ X . On the other hand, if there is a ϕ ∈ X
such that ρ(ϕ) ≤ η = ρ(ψ), by the comprehensiveness of X, we have ψ ∈ X , which
contradicts the fact ψ 6∈ X . ThereforeX = Cut(ρ, η), i.e., X = Cut(ρ, ρ(X)). 
3.2 Belief state
As we have mentioned in the previous subsection, a belief state in the AGM theory
consists of a belief set and an epistemic entrenchment ordering. With the concept of en-
trenchment measure we can update the definition of belief state by using entrenchment
measure. Intuitively, all statements about a bargaining situation are ranked by each ne-
gotiator in terms of entrenchment measure but only those which ranks are greater than a
certain “cut-off” are the actual negotiation items the negotiator bargains for. Formally,
we have the following definition.
Definition 3 A belief state is a pair (ρ, e), where ρ is an entrenchment measure and e
is a real number, satisfying the following conditions:
(NV) ρ(>) > e. (Non-vacuity)
(DB) ρ(ψ) = e for some ψ ∈ L. (Descriptive bottom-line)
If we let Bel(ρ, e) = {ϕ ∈ L : ρ(ϕ) > e}, then Bel(ρ, e) represents all the nego-
tiation items of a negotiator. (NV) guarantees that all tautologies are fully entrenched
by each negotiator. (DV) ensures that Bel(ρ, e) is consistent and logically closed, that
is, Bel(ρ, e) 6` ⊥ and Bel(ρ, e) = Cn(Bel(ρ, e)). In other words, a belief state deter-
mines a unique belief set Bel(ρ, e) and an ordering over the belief set (induced by ρ).
Therefore the belief state we defined above extends the concept of belief state in belief
revision (see [21]).
3 Without the assumption of the finiteness of logical language, the definition would be invalid.
Eliminating the assumption requires rephrasing of several definitions, including the redefini-
tion of this concept by using “sup”.
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3.3 Bargaining games
Now we are ready to formalize a bargaining situation. We shall consider n-person bar-
gaining situations. We let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} stand for a set of negotiators, called
players, where n ≥ 2. Each player i ∈ N is characterized by her belief state (ρi, ei).
Bel(ρi, ei) then represents all her negotiation items. We define an n-person bargaining
game to be a vector in the form of ((ρ1, e1), · · · , (ρn, en)), denoted by ((ρi, ei))i∈N .
Bn,L denotes the class of all n-person bargaining games described in L.
We might want to compare the concept of bargaining games defined above with
the standard definition of bargaining games in game theory. Let us refer them to as
logical games and numerical games, respectively4. Besides the difference of represen-
tation, there are a few more subtle differences between these two concepts. Firstly, in
our definition, the belief states of players are independent each other. A player vary-
ing its negotiation items or entrenchment measure does not affect other players’ belief
states while, in game theory, a change of demands from one player would alter the set
of alternatives, thus affects the utility functions of other players. Secondly, the logical
games encode more information than the numerical games because a belief state not
only quantifies players’ preferences but also specifies their beliefs, demands and threats
as well as their logical relations.
The following concepts will be used in the rest of the paper.
A bargaining game is compatible if there is no conflict among the collective negoti-
ation items, that is,
⋃
i∈N Bel(ρi, ei) is consistent.
A bargaining game is mutually comparable if ρi(>) = ρj(>) and ei = ej for all
i, j ∈ N .
A bargaining game is normalized if ρi(>) = 1 and ei = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Given two bargaining games B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N and B′ = ((ρ′i, e′i))i∈N , we say B′
to be a subgame of B, denoted by B′ v B, if, for each i ∈ N ,
1. e′i ≥ ei;
2. ρ′i(ϕ) = ρi(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ L such that ρi(ϕ) > e′i;
From the definition we can easily see that ifB′ v B, thenBel(ρ′i, e′i) = Cut(ρi, e′i) ⊆
Bel(ρi, ei) for all i. In other words, the negotiation items of B ′ for each player is the
most entrenched segment (the top part) of the negotiation items of B, or, B extends B ′
by appending more weaker entrenched negotiation items5 .
Example 2 Consider a 2-person bargaining game in which player 1 demands p and
player 2 asks for q. Both players firmly believe that p and q can never be true at the
same time, i.e., ¬(p ∧ q). We depict the game with Figure 1.
4 More precisely, they should be called as logically represented bargaining games and numeri-
cally represented bargaining games, respectively, because both of them can basically address
the same domain of problems (assuming any continuous domain can be discretized in a certain
method).
5 The reader is invited to compare the concept of subgame with the set-inclusion over feasible
sets in game theory. You might find that the subgame is much more restrictive. This indicates
that our axiom of monotonicity is much weaker than its game-theoretic counterpart (see Sec-
tion 4.1 for more details).
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true,
p
Player 1 Player 2
false false
, true
0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
   (p    q)    (p    q)
q
Fig. 1. An example of two person bargaining game.
In this figure, the player 1’s entrenchment measure is: ρ1(>) = ρ1(¬(p∧q)) = 1.0,
ρ1(p) = 0.6 and ρ1(⊥) = 0. Player 2’s entrenchment measure is similar except for
ρ2(q) = 0.7. Note that we did not provide the entrenchment values for the whole lan-
guage. We can generate the other values by using the procedure provided in Appendix.
Then the bargaining game can be denoted by ((ρ1, 0), (ρ2, 0)). Examples of subgames
of the game can be easily given, such as ((ρ1, 0.5), (ρ2, 0.5)) and ((ρ1, 0.8), (ρ2, 0.6)).
3.4 Possible deals and bargaining solutions
Different from the traditional bargaining theory, possible agreements are not given in a
bargaining game. However, we can generate the set of possible agreements according
to players’ belief states. We consider that the outcome of a negotiation is a collective
concessions made by all the players. Therefore a possible agreement can be easily rep-
resented by a vector of subsets of negotiation items. This idea is inspired by Zhang et
al.’s work in [22].
Definition 4 Let B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N be a bargaining game. A deal of B is a vector
D = (D1, · · · , Dn) satisfying:
1. Di ⊆ Bel(ρi, ei) for all i ∈ N .
2.
⋃
i∈N Di is consistent.
3. Di is comprehensive w.r.t. ρi for all i ∈ N .
The set of all deals of B is denoted by Ω(B), i.e., the feasible set of B.
The first two requirements in the definition are purely logical and intuitive. The third
one relies on entrenchment measure of each player. In order to reach an agreement,
a player might have to make a concession, i.e., gives up some negotiation items she
originally holds. It is reasonable to assume that when a player does so, she always
abandons those less entrenched items and try to keep the higher entrenched items as
many as possible. Therefore a concession is actually a contraction of negotiation items
possibly with a higher cut-off. This idea is exactly the same as “cut revision” [28] and
is also implicitly assumed by the AGM theory [21]. Note that (∅, · · · , ∅) belongs to
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any feasible set of bargaining games. We call this deal the disagreement deal. Therefore
Ω(B) is always non-empty and finite for any B ∈ Bn,L.
We would like to remark here that the game-theoretic abstraction of bargaining starts
from given feasible sets in which inconsistent negotiation items have been resolved.
This explains why the game-theoretic characterization of bargaining solutions does not
include a mechanism of conflict resolving. This fact seemingly has been largely ignored
in the game theory literature.
Definition 5 A bargaining solution on Bn,L is a function f that assigns to a bargaining
game B ∈ Bn,L a unique deal of the game, i.e., f(B) ∈ Ω(B).
Since Ω(B) can never be empty, a solution always exists. The agreement can then
be defines as:
A(B) = Cn(
⋃
i∈N
fi(B)) (3)
Note that it is not necessary that all the items in the final agreement are visible to
every player6. The actual contract, which is visible to everybody will be a subset of the
final agreement, containing all the demands that have been agreed by all the parties.
Another comment we would like to make here is that a bargaining solution is purely
represented by logical statements even though the determination of a solution relies
on the numerical measure of entrenchment. It returns the agreement itself rather than
its utility values. This is a significant difference between our approach and the game-
theoretic approach.
3.5 Comparison of possible deals and measurement of satisfaction
There are a few ways to compare different possible agreements. The first approach is
based on set-inclusion over vectors. For any two deals D,D′ ∈ Ω(B), we write
– D  D′ iff Di ⊇ D′i for all i;
– D < D′ iff D  D′ but D 6= D′;
– D  D′ iff Di ⊃ D′i for all i.
Similar to the standard notations in game theory, we define the weak Pareto frontier
of a game B as
WP (B) = {D ∈ Ω(B) : D′  D implies D′ 6∈ Ω(B)} (4)
and the strong Pareto frontier of B as
P (B) = {D ∈ Ω(B) : D′ < D implies D′ 6∈ Ω(B)}. (5)
The above comparison criteria and the concepts of Pareto frontiers are defined
purely in logical form without using the numerical measure of entrenchment. Since
a deal is determined by each player’s cut-off, we can also compare different deals in
numerical measurement.
6 We assume that there is a virtual arbitrator who can see all the items in the final agreement.
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Given a deal D, for each player i, we know that ρi(Di) is the cut-off of ρi for set
Di (see Lemma 2). Therefore the lower ρi(Di) is, the bigger Di is. We can then use
the value of ρi(>)−ρi(Di) to measureDi. However, this value relies on the individual
scale of entrenchment measure, so it is not interpersonally comparable. A better mea-
surement to assess the gain of a player is λi = ρi(>)−ρi(Di)ρi(>)−ei . We call λi the player i’s
degree of satisfaction. Obviously, λi ∈ [0, 1].
We remark that the concept of satisfaction is different from the concept of entrench-
ment measure. The former indicates the gain of a player from a deal while the latter
represents the preference of a bargainer over her negotiation items.
Different from Zhang in [25], we do not view ρi(>) − ρi(Di) or ρi(>)−ρi(Di)ρi(>)−ei as
the utility of player i because we are not going to apply lotteries over the set of pos-
sible deals. Therefore such a definition will not result in a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. However, it is wroth mentioning that the degree of satisfaction is invariant under
positive affine transformations on entrenchment measure, so is satisfies part of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions.
3.6 Numerical mapping
We have seen the differences between the logical representation and game-theoretic
representation of bargaining situations. There are also close relationships between them.
Given a logical game B, we let
S(B) = {x ∈ <n : ∃D ∈ Ω(B)∀i ∈ N. Di = Cut(ρi, ρi(>)− xi)} (6)
It is not hard to see that each point in S(B) uniquely determines a deal in Ω(B)
(not true inversely). In particular, the point 0 = (0, · · · , 0) corresponds to the empty
deal (∅, · · · , ∅) ∈ Ω(B). Therefore, for each logical game B, there exists a unique
numerical game (S(B), 0) that corresponds to B. We call S(B) the numerical feasible
set of B. Unfortunately, S(B) is not necessarily convex unless B is compatible. Figure
2 in Section 4.2 depicts a typical example of such a numerical game. The following
observation shows that such a numerical feasible set is comprehensive and compact.
Observation 2 For any bargaining game B, S(B) is 0-comprehensive and compact.
Proof: Assume that x ∈ S(B) and x > y > 0. There exists D ∈ Ω(B) such that
Di = Cut(ρi, ρi(>) − xi) for all i. Since x > y, we have Cut(ρi, ρi(>) − yi) ⊆ Di.
It turns out that (Cut(ρi, ρi(>)− yi))i∈N is a deal ofB, which implies that y ∈ S(B).
Therefore S(B) is 0-comprehensive.
S(B) is obviously bounded. To show it is also closed, i.e., S(B) contains its bound-
ary, let xk → x, where xk ∈ S(B). For each k, there is Dk ∈ Ω(B) such that
Dki = Cut(ρi, ρi(>) − x
k
i ). According to Lemma 2, Dki = Cut(ρi, ρi(Dki )). It
follows by the definition of ρi(Dki ) that ρi(>) − xki ≥ ρi(Dki ), which implies that
xki ≤ ρi(>)− ρi(D
k
i ). Since L is finite, the total number of the possible different val-
ues of ρi(Dki ) is finite. Therefore there exists a big enough ki such that for all k ≥ ki,
xi ≤ ρi(>)−ρi(Dki ). Let kˆ = max
i
ki. We then have xi ≤ ρi(>)−ρi(Dkˆi ) for all i. We
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yield thatCut(ρi, ρi(>)−xi) ⊆ Dkˆ. It follows that (Cut(ρi, ρi(>)−xi))i∈N ∈ Ω(B),
that is, x ∈ S(B). Therefore S(B) is closed, so is compact. 
With this numerical mapping, one may think that our problem could be easily solved
by applying any game-theoretic solution to its corresponding numerical game and con-
verting the solution back to logical form. There are both technical and methodological
obstacles that block us to do so.
From the technical point of view, the corresponded numerical games are not nec-
essarily convex. All the classical bargaining solutions that require convexity are not
applicable to our domain [7]. Even those solutions for non-convex domain fail to apply
to our problem because these solutions requires to convexify a feasible set or alter a
feasible set by using convex hell or set operations [29,30,31,32]. Any such “artificial
changes” on feasible sets could result in the numerical games losing its connection to
the original logical games.
More importantly, the game-theoretic characterization of bargaining situations re-
flects only the numerical properties of bargaining solutions. It cannot capture the logical
reasoning behind bargaining activities. The ultimate goal of the work is to identify the
logical characteristics of bargaining situations. Simply defining a solution does not meet
the goal.
4 Logical characterization of bargaining solutions
In this section, we present a logical characterization of bargaining solutions. Similar
to the non-convex extensions of bargaining solutions in game theory, it is impossible
to keep the uniqueness of solution while requiring the solution to be symmetric and
Pareto efficient. We shall offer two different characterizations: unique solution with
weak Pareto optimality and multiple solutions with Pareto optimality.
4.1 Basic assumptions and axioms
We first investigate the properties we expect a bargaining solution to hold and then try
to find the solution that satisfies these properties. Before we start, let us review the
properties which have been built in the definition of bargaining solution (see Definition
4):
(IR) fi(B) ⊆ Bel(ρi, ei) for all i. (Individual Rationality)
(Con) ⋃i∈N fi(B) is consistent. (Consistency)
(Com) fi(B) is comprehensive w.r.t ρi for all i. (Comprehensiveness)
The first two assumptions originate from the AGM postulates for single belief re-
vision [33]. Zhang et al. and Booth extend them to mutilagent belief revision [34,22].
IR confines the bargaining theme to the participants’ interests since the only concern of
each player is her own negotiation items. Con prevents inconsistent agreements. As we
remarked in Section 3.1, the logical comprehensiveness has been exclusively used in the
construction of belief revision operators. We emphasize that the numerical comprehen-
siveness is also important for numerical bargaining games, especially for non-convex
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domains. Roth in [35] has shown that weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and restricted
monotonicity are incompatible if the comprehensiveness is not imposed on the numeri-
cal domain of problems. We have seen in last section that the logical comprehensiveness
guarantees the comprehensiveness of its corresponding numerical domain (Observation
2). In fact, the assumption Com provides a natural link between the logical and numer-
ical representations of bargaining situations.
Now let us consider another set of fundamental properties of bargaining. We shall
refer them to as axioms.
(CR) If B is compatible, fi(B) = Bel(ρi, ei) for all i. (Collective Rationality)
(Inv) For any positive affine transformation τ over <n, f(τ(B)) = f(B), where
τ(B) = ((τi ◦ ρi, τi(ei)))i∈N . (Scale Invariance)
(Sym) There exists a real number λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all i, fi(B) = {ϕ ∈ L :
ρi(ϕ) > λei + (1− λ)ρi(>)} (Symmetry)
(MCM) For any mutually comparable bargaining games B and B ′, B′ v B implies
f(B′)  f(B). (Mutually Comparable Monotonicity)
CR says that if there is no conflict of interest among the players, all negotiation
items from all players should be mutually accepted. This assumption is fundamental to
bargaining reasoning for two reasons:
– It reflects the cooperative aspect of bargaining in the sense that every player has
incentive to cooperate unless there is a contradiction to her interest.
– It sets out the termination condition for any bargaining procedure. Negotiation is a
mean to resolve conflicts. Once the conflicts are settled, there is no need for further
compromise.
This axiom is purely logical and is also a fundamental assumption in belief revision,
known as Expansion [21].
Inv states that the scaling of players’ entrenchment measures does not affect bar-
gaining outcomes. Obviously this axioms is an analogue of its game-theoretic counter-
part even though there is a subtle difference between them. The axiom says that the
solution is invariant under the transformation, i.e., f(τ(B)) = f(B) rather than co-
shifting under the transformation, i.e., f(τ(B)) = τ(f(B)).
Sym is to impose fairness on bargaining outcomes. This can be easily done with
game theory model. If the players cannot be differentiated on the basis of the descrip-
tion of a bargaining situation after numerical abstraction, we can safely assume that all
players gain the same from the bargaining [1]. However, the approach is not applica-
ble to the logically represented bargaining problems because we cannot simply assume
that all players have identical logical description about their bargaining situations. If it
were so, there would be no conflict between players. In fact, a “fair bargain” does not
mean each player receives the same gain from the bargain but means that “the bargain
gives each player equal amount of satisfaction she expect to get from the negotiation”
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(otherwise, the less satisfied player could refuse the bargain) 7. Sym expresses the idea
exactly.
MCM says that expanding a bargaining game by allowing every player to append
more negotiation items will not affect the previously reached agreement provided the
appended negotiation items are less entrenched than the existing ones and the expansion
is done evenly by all players. It is easy to see that this axiom is an analogue of Roth’s
Restricted Monotonicity [35]. However, MCM is much weaker than Restricted Mono-
tonicity because the relationship of subgames is more restrictive than set-inclusion over
feasible sets.
To capture the intuition behind these axioms, let us consider a simple sequential
bargaining model8. Suppose that any negotiation is carried out within an allocated time
slot. At the beginning of a negotiation, all players submit their negotiation items to an
arbitrator. After the game started, each player can withdraw some of her own items from
the arbitrator any time during the negotiation period. Once the arbitrator finds that all
the remaining items are consistent, she will terminate the procedure and announce the
final agreement. We assume that players are impatient with the unproductive passage of
time so that they may drop some of less entrenched items with the elapse of time.
Now we can provide a more intuitive interpretation for each of the above axioms.
CR establishes the termination condition for the arbitrator to apply. Inv allows the play-
ers each to adjust their entrenchment measures so that the entrenchment measure coin-
cides with the time interval (starting from the same e and ending with the same ρ(>)).
Sym says that at the time when the negotiation terminates, all the remaining items are
included in the final agreement. MCM expresses the ides that a longer negotiation time
would result in a richer agreement.
4.2 Maxmin solutions
We now search for a solution that satisfies the above axioms. One of the most intuitive
idea to construct a bargaining solution is that a solution should be able to balance and
maximize the degrees of satisfaction for all players. This leads to the following concept.
Definition 6 For any bargaining game B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N , let
Λ(B) = arg max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)− ρi(Di)
ρi(>)− ei
(7)
We call any solution f on Bn,L satisfying f(B) ∈ Λ(B) a maxmin solution.
7 A similar idea has been already expressed in the Nash’s original work : “A solution means
a determination of the amount of satisfaction each individual should expect to get from the
situation. ... It is reasonable to assume that the two, being rational, would simply agree to that
anticipation, or to an equivalent one.” [1] .
8 Fully developing a sequential model for the logically represented bargaining problems is out
of the scope of this paper even though it can be of great help for a deep understanding of the
axioms.
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Recall that “argmax” denotes the arguments of max. Thus Λ(B) contains all the
deals in Ω(B) that maximizes the satisfaction of the least satisfied players. In other
words, a maxmin solution tries to maximize and balance the degrees of satisfaction of
all players. Apparently, the maxmin solutions of a game are not necessarily unique. The
following function defines a unique solution on Bn,L.
Definition 7 Let
F (B) = (
⋂
D∈Λ(B)
D1, · · · ,
⋂
D∈Λ(B)
Dn) (8)
We call F the modest maxmin solution.
Figure 2 illustrates the numerical domain of a typical logical bargaining game and
its maxmin solutions (efficient maxmin solutions will be defined in Section 4.4).
(r (T)-e ,0)
(0,r (T)-e )2 2
1 1(0,0)
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Fig. 2. Numerical domain of a bargaining game and its maxmin solutions.
Example 3 Consider the game in Example 2. There is only one maxmin solution to this
game (Cn{¬(p∧q)}, Cn{¬p, q}), which is also the modest maxmin solution. However,
if ρ1(p) = ρ2(q) < 1.0, there will be two maxmin solutions: (Cn{p,¬q}, Cn{¬(p ∧
q)}) and (Cn{¬(p∧q)}, Cn{¬p, q}). The modest maxmin solution is then (Cn{¬(p∧
q)}, Cn{¬(p∧q)}). If ρ1(p) = ρ2(q) = 1.0, then the modest maxmin solution is (∅, ∅),
the disagreement deal.
The following result gives a more concrete construction of F . It also shows that F
itself is a maxmin solution.
Lemma 3 Given B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N , let
λ = max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)− ρi(Di)
ρi(>)− ei
. (9)
Then Fi(B) = {ϕ ∈ L : ρi(ϕ) > λei + (1 − λ)ρi(>)} for all i. Moreover, F (B) ∈
Λ(B).
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Proof: For each i, let
Dˆi = {ϕ ∈ L : ρi(ϕ) > λei + (1− λ)ρi(>)}.
Assume that D ∈ Λ(B). Since min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
= λ, we have ρi(Di) ≤ λei +
(1 − λ)ρi(>) for all i. It implies that for any ϕ, if ϕ ∈ Dˆi, then ϕ ∈ Di (otherwise,
ρi(Di) ≥ ρi(ϕ) > λei+(1−λ)ρi(>), a contradiction). This means that Dˆi ⊆ Di. We
then yield that Dˆi ⊆ Fi(B) for all i. It also implies that Dˆ ∈ Ω(B).
On the other hand, for each i, we have ρi(Dˆi) ≤ λei + (1 − λ)ρi(>). Thus
ρi(>)−ρi(Dˆi)
ρi(>)−ei
≥ λ. It follows that min
i
ρi(>)−ρi(Dˆi)
ρi(>)−ei
≥ λ. Since Dˆ ∈ Ω(B) and λ
is maximal to all deals, we have min
i
ρi(>)−ρi(Dˆi)
ρi(>)−ei
= λ, which implies that Dˆ ∈ Λ(B).
Therefore for each i, Fi(B) ⊆ Dˆi. We conclude that F (B) = Dˆ. Consequently we
have F (B) ∈ Λ(B). 
The following observation shows that the modest maxmin solution is a logical ver-
sion of KS-solution according to the numerical mapping introduced in Section 3.6.
Observation 3 Given a bargaining game B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N , let S(B) the numerical
feasible set of B (defined by (6)). Then for any i ∈ N ,
Fi(B) = Cut(ρi, ρi(>)−KSi(S(B), 0)) (10)
where KS(S(B), 0) is the KS-solution of the numerical game (S(B), 0).
Proof: We first calculate the ideal point. Notice that for any x ∈ S(B), 0 ≤ xi ≤
ρi(>)−ei for any i ∈ N . On the other hand, we know (∅, · · · , ∅, Bel(ρi, ei), ∅, · · · , ∅) ∈
Ω(B), which corresponds to the point (0, · · · , 0, ρi(>)− ei, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ S(B). There-
fore the ideal point a(S, 0) is (ρ1(>)− e1, · · · , ρn(>)− en).
Now we prove (10). According to Lemma 3, it suffices to show thatKSi(S(B), 0) =
λ(ρi(>) − ei) for all i, where λ is defined by (9). Let x∗ = (λ(ρi(>) − ei))i∈N .
Firstly, since λ ∈ [0, 1], the point x∗ is on the segment from 0 to a(S(B), 0). Secondly,
F (B) ∈ Ω(B) implies that x∗ ∈ S(B) because of Lemma 3. Finally we need to prove
that x∗ is the maximizer of S(B) on the segment from 0 to a(S, 0). If it is not, there
exists λ′ ∈ [0, 1] such that λ′ > λ and (λ′(ρi(>) − ei))i∈N ∈ S(B). It follows that
there is a deal D ∈ Ω(B) such that
Di = Cut(ρi, λ
′ei + (1− λ
′)ρi(>)) for all i.
Therefore ρi(Di) ≤ λ′ei + (1− λ′)ρi(>), i.e., ρi(>)−ρi(Di)ρi(>)−ei ≥ λ
′ for all i. It turns out
that min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
≥ λ′ > λ, which contradicts the definition of λ. 
4.3 Characterization
The following theorem shows that the modest maxmin solution is characterized by the
four axoms: Collective Rationality, Scale Invariance, Symmetry and Mutually Compa-
rable Monotonicity.
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Theorem 1 A bargaining solution on Bn,L satisfies CR, Inv, Sym and MCM if and
only if it is the modest maxmin solution F .
Proof: “⇐” Lemma 3 has shown that F is a bargaining solution. We are to verify that F
satisfies the four axioms. Sym is implied by Lemma 3. CR is true because if B is com-
patible, (Bel(ρ1, e1), · · · , Bel(ρn, en)) is the unique maximizer of min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
.
Inv holds because ρi(>)−ρi(Fi(B))
ρi(>)−ei
is invariant under any positive affine transforma-
tion. We now prove MCM. Consider two mutually comparable bargaining games B =
((ρi, ei))i∈N and B′ = ((ρ′i, e′i))i∈N . Let
λ = max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
, λ′ = max
D∈Ω(B′)
min
i∈N
ρ′
i
(>)−ρ′
i
(Di)
ρ′
i
(>)−e′
i
Since both B and B′ are mutually comparable, for each i, we have
λei + (1− λ)ρi(>) = min
D∈Ω(B)
max
i∈N
ρi(Di) (11)
λ′e′i + (1− λ
′)ρ′i(>) = min
D∈Ω(B′)
max
i∈N
ρ′i(Di) (12)
As B′ v B implies Ω(B′) ⊆ Ω(B), it is not hard to prove that for any D ∈
Ω(B′) and i ∈ N , ρ′i(Di) ≥ ρi(Di). It then follows that min
D∈Ω(B′)
max
i∈N
ρ′i(Di) ≥
min
D∈Ω(B)
max
i∈N
ρi(Di). By using (11) and (12), we yield that λ′e′i + (1 − λ′)ρ′i(>) ≥
λei + (1− λ)ρi(>). According to Lemma 3, we conclude that F (B ′)  F (B).
“⇒” Given a bargaining game B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N , we can find a positive affine
transformation τ = (τ1, · · · , τn) such that τi(ρi(>)) = τj(ρj(>)) and τi(ei) = τj(ej)
for any i, j. By Inv, we have f(τ(B)) = f(B). Therefore we can simply assume thatB
itself is mutually comparable. According to Sym, there exists a real number λ¯ ∈ [0, 1]
such that
fi(B) = {ϕ : ρi(ϕ) > λ¯ei + (1− λ¯)ρi(>)} for each i ∈ N. (13)
For each i, we know that ρi(fi(B)) ≤ λ¯ei + (1− λ¯)ρi(>). Thus λ¯ ≤ ρi(>)−ρi(fi(B))ρi(>)−ei
for all i. It follows that λ¯ ≤ min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(fi(B))
ρi(>)−ei
.
Let λ = max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
. Since f(B) ∈ Ω(B), we have λ¯ ≤ λ. By
Lemma 3,
Fi(B) = {ϕ : ρi(ϕ) > λei + (1− λ)ρi(>)} for all i. (14)
Comparing (13) and 14, we know that λ¯ ≤ λ implies fi(B) ⊆ Fi(B) for all i. It turns
out that f(B)  F (B).
To show F (B)  f(B), let B′ = ((ρ′i, e′i))i∈N be a bargaining game such that, for
each i ∈ N ,
1. e′i = λei + (1− λ)ρi(>);
2. ρ′i(ϕ) =
{
ρi(ϕ), if ϕ ∈ Fi(B);
λei + (1− λ)ρi(>), otherwise.
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where λ is defined above. It is easy to see that B ′ v B and B′ is mutually compara-
ble. Moreover, B′ is compatible. According to CR and Lemma 3, f(B ′) = F (B). By
MCM, we have f(B′)  f(B). Therefore f(B) = F (B). 
The above result is similar to but different from Conley and Wilkie’s characteriza-
tion of KS-solution to non-convex problems [36]. In that work, the KS-solution is char-
acterized by weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance and restricted mono-
tonicity with comprehensive but not necessarily convex domain of problems. We will
show that replacing CR with weak Pareto optimality does not lead to a characterization
of the modest maxmin solution (see Section 4.5 Observation 5).
4.4 Pareto efficient solutions
Whenever a negotiation comes to a standstill, the modest maxmin solution assumes that
an balanced concession will be made by all the parties in order to reach an agreement.
Therefore the outcome is not necessarily Pareto efficient.
Definition 8 A maxmin solution f on Bn,L is efficient if it satisfies the following
property:
(PO) f(B) ∈ P (B). (Pareto Optimality)
where P (B) is the strong Pareto frontier of B defined by (5).
PO requires a solution to maximize the gains of all players. To achieve this goal,
strong cooperation among all players is needed. Consider the scenario in Example 2.
If both players entrench their demands with the same strength, i.e., ρ1(p) = ρ2(q), the
negotiation will fall into a standstill. If nobody is willing to give in, the outcome of the
negotiation will reach a lose-lose situation, which is not Pareto optimal. However, if one
of the player agrees to give way to the other, a Pareto optimal solution will be achieved
(see Example 3).
A few issues arise when we try to characterize the efficient maxmin solutions.
Firstly, the efficient maxmin solutions are not necessarily unique. A solution maximiz-
ing one player’s gain might not be able to maximize the gain of other players. Secondly,
PO is not compatible with Sym. A counterexample can be easily constructed by using
Example 2. MCM is also no long true for efficient maxmin solutions. This is because
one efficient solution that favors one player in one game might not do the same in its
subgames. However, the efficient maxmin solutions satisfy the following natural weak-
ening of MCM9:
(R. MCM) For any mutually comparable bargaining games B and B ′, if B′ v B and
B′ is compatible, then f(B′)  f(B). (Restricted Mutually Comparable
Monotonicity)
9 Interestingly, Hougaard and Tvede in [30] also introduce a weak version of monotonicity in
a similar way by requiring the “small” problem to be convex. However, no intuitive remark
is given. In fact, R.MCM provides a good interpretation for their axiom because a compatible
game corresponds to a convex numerical feasible set.
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The following theorem shows that an efficient maxmin solution is characterized by
the three axioms: Scale Invariance, Pareto Optimality and Restricted Mutually Compa-
rable Monotonicity.
Theorem 2 A bargaining solution on Bn,L is an efficient maxmin solution if and only
if it satisfies Inv, PO and R.MCM.
Proof: ”⇐” The only non-trivial proof is the one for R.MCM. Suppose that B ′, B ∈
Bn,L are both mutually comparable. Assume that B ′ v B and B′ is compatible. Let
e′ = e′i for all i. Then for each i, fi(B′) = Bel(ρ′i, e′1) = {ϕ : ρ′i(ϕ) > e′i} = {ϕ :
ρi(ϕ) > e
′}. It follows that ρi(fi(B′)) ≤ e′. Thus max
i∈N
ρi(fi(B
′)) ≤ e′. Since f(B′) ∈
Ω(B), we then have min
D∈Ω(B)
max
i∈N
ρi(Di) ≤ e′. Let λ = max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
.
Because B is mutually comparable, we can entail that e′ ≥ λei + (1 − λ)ρi(>) for
all i. By Lemma 3, we know Fi(B) = {ϕ : ρi(ϕ) > λei + (1 − λ)ρi(>)}. Therefore
fi(B
′) ⊆ Fi(B) ⊆ fi(B) for each i, as desired.
“⇒” Given a game B = ((ρi, ei))i∈N , by Inv, we can simply assume that B is
mutually comparable. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we let B ′ = ((ρ′i, e′i))i∈N be
a bargaining game such that, for each i ∈ N ,
1. e′i = λei + (1− λ)ρi(>);
2. ρ′i(ϕ) =
{
ρi(ϕ), if ϕ ∈ Fi(B);
λei + (1− λ)ρi(>), otherwise.
where λ = max
D∈Ω(B)
min
i∈N
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
. Thus B′ v B and Bel(ρ′i, e′i) = Fi(B) for all
i. In addition,
⋃
i∈N
Fi(B) is consistent. Hence F (B) ∈ Ω(B′) and F (B) is the only
Pareto optimal deal in Ω(B′). Applying PO on Ω(B′), we get f(B′) = F (B). Since
B′ is mutually comparable and compatible, by R.MCM, we have f(B ′)  f(B), i.e.,
F (B)  f(B), which implies that f(B) ∈ Λ(B). Therefore f is a maxmin solution.
By PO, we conclude that f is an efficient maxmin solution. 
In [30], Hougaard and Tvede characterize the efficient KS-solutions to non-convex
problems with the axioms similar to the original KS axioms. Xu and Yoshihara in [37]
also presents a characterization of the set-valued KS-solution with an axiomatization
that is more close to the original KS axioms than Hougaard and Tvede’s but assum-
ing comprehensiveness. Interestingly, both characterizations are more complicated than
ours even though they are based on a higher level abstraction than the logical abstrac-
tion. Notice that we do not require symmetry because symmetry is not a characteristic
of the Pareto efficient solutions.
4.5 Other axioms and their relationships
In this section, we consider a few other properties of bargaining solutions that have been
exclusively investigated in game theory, such as weak Pareto optimality, Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives and Independence of Alternative Other Than the Disagree-
ment Point and Ideal Point.
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Weak Pareto Optimality Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) was firstly introduced by
Nash in [1]. It says that a negotiation will not end up with an agreement if there is
available outcome in which they are all better off. In most situations, WPO is more
acceptable than PO because it requires less cooperation among players. The logical
version of WPO can be easily expressed as follows:
(WPO) f(B) ∈WP (B). (Weak Pareto Optimality)
The following result shows that the modest maxmin solution is weakly efficient.
Observation 4 CR, Inv, Sym and MCM implies WPO:
Proof: According to Theorem 1, we only have to show F satisfies WPO. Suppose that
there exists a deal D ∈ Ω(B) such that D  F (B). Then for each i ∈ N , there is a
sentence ϕ ∈ Di such that ϕ 6∈ Fi(B). It follows that ρi(Fi(B)) ≥ ρi(ϕ). Since Di is
comprehensive, ρi(ϕ) > ρi(Di). It turns out that ρi(Fi(B)) > ρi(Di), which implies
that ρi(>)−ρi(Fi(B))
ρi(>)−ei
<
ρi(>)−ρi(Di)
ρi(>)−ei
. Therefore F (B) 6∈ Λ(B), a contradiction. 
One might think that we can replace CR by using WPO in Theorem 1. However,
this is not true.
Observation 5 CR is independent of Inv, Sym, MCM and WPO.
Proof: We know that all the five axioms together induce a solution to be the modest
maxmin solution. To show the independence of CR, it suffices to exhibit a solution that
satisfies all the other four axioms and is different from the modest maxmin solution F
(see Definition 6). We only consider the case when n = 2. The proof can be easily
extended to the cases when n > 2.
We construct a bargaining solution F c on B2,L in the following. For any game
B = ((ρ1, e1), (ρ2, e2)),
Case 1: if B satisfies the condition Bel(ρ1, e1) = Cn(>) and Bel(ρ2, e2) ⊃ {ϕ :
ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)} (i.e., ∃ψ ∈ Bel(ρ2, e2).ρ2(ψ) < ρ2(>)), we let
F c1 (B) = Cn(>) and
F c2 (B) = {ϕ : ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)};
Case 2: otherwise, we let F c(B) = F (B).
Note that Cn(>) represents the set of all tautologies. {ϕ : ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)} repre-
sents all the statements that are entrenched by player 2 as firmly as a tautology. It is not
hard to construct such a game that satisfies the condition of case 1. Since any game B
in case 1 is compatible, we have F2(B) = Bel(ρ2, e2). Therefore F c diverges from F
in case 1. Now we only need to prove that F c satisfies all the four axioms. Obviously,
F c satisfies WPO because F c1 (B) = F1(B) for any B ∈ B2,L.
To verify Inv, notice that the condition of case 1 is invariant under any positive affine
transformation. It is sufficient to show that the solution F c is invariant for any game that
satisfies the condition of case 1. This is obviously true because aρ2(ϕ)+b = aρ2(>)+b
iff ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>) for any ϕ, a(> 0) and b.
To show Sym, given a game B, if it is in case 2, we have F c(B) = F (B). If B
belongs to case 1, we let λ = ρ2(>)−ρ2(F
c
2
(B))
ρ2(>)−e2
, or, ρ2(F
c
2 (B)) = λe2 + (1− λ)ρ2(>).
Dagstuhl Seminar-07351–Discussion Paper 21
Since F c2 (B) is comprehensive, we have F c2 (B) = Cut(ρ2, ρ2(F c2 (B))). Therefore
we yield that F c1 (B) = Cn(>) = Bel(ρ1, e1) = Cut(ρ1, λe2 + (1 − λ)ρ2(>)) and
F c2 (B) = Cut(ρ2, ρ2(F
c
2 (B))) = Cut(ρ2, λe2 + (1− λ)ρ2(>)).
Finally we prove MCM. Given two mutually comparable games B and B ′ such
that B′ v B, if B and B′ are both in case 2, then the result is obviously true. If both
are in case 1, then F c1 (B′) = F c1 (B). To compare F c2 (B′) and F c2 (B), notice that for
any ϕ ∈ Bel(ρ′2, e′2), we have ρ′(ϕ) = ρ(ϕ). Therefore F c2 (B′) = {ϕ ∈ Bel(ρ′2, e′2) :
ρ′2(ϕ) = ρ
′
2(>)} = {ϕ ∈ Bel(ρ
′
2, e
′
2) : ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)} ⊆ {ϕ ∈ Bel(ρ2, e2) :
ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)}. It then follows that F c2 (B′) ⊆ F c2 (B). We get F c(B′)  F c(B). If
B′ in case 1 and B in case 2, we have F c(B′)  F (B′)  F (B) = F c(B). Therefore
F c(B′)  F c(B). If B′ is in case 2 and B in case 1, it must be in the situation that
Bel(ρ1, e1) = Bel(ρ
′
1, e
′
1) = Cn(>) and Bel(ρ′2, e′2) = {ϕ : ρ′2(ϕ) = ρ′2(>)}.
Therefore F c1 (B) = F c1 (B′) = Cn(>) and F c2 (B) = {ϕ : ρ2(ϕ) = ρ2(>)} = {ϕ :
ρ′2(ϕ) = ρ
′
2(>)} = F2(B
′) = F c2 (B
′). Surely we have F c(B′)  F c(B).
To conclude, we have proved that there exists a solution that satisfies the axioms
WPO, Inv, Sym and MCM but the solution is not identical to the modest maxmin so-
lution. Therefore these axioms do not imply CR. 
This result shows that the four axioms Inv, Sym, MCM and WPO are not enough to
characterize the modest maxmin solution. According to Conley and Wilkie’s result, we
can conclude that the axioms Inv, Sym, and MCM are weaker than their game-theoretic
counterparts. The logical axiom CR plays an irreplaceable role in the characterization
of the logical bargaining solution.
Contraction independence Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is another
fundamental assumption in Nash’s bargaining theory. The idea can be expressed in our
terminology as follows:
(UC) If B′ v B and f(B) ∈ Ω(B′), then f(B′) = f(B). (Unbalanced Contraction)
Nash’s IIA is the most controversial one among his axioms [7]. Consider a sim-
ple example. A young couple were deciding how to spend the coming weekend. The
boy suggested to see the new released movie “Casino Royale” ({seeing a movie,
Casino Royale}). The girl agreed on seeing a movie but does not like 007 ({seeing a movie,
¬Casino Royale}). After a unpleasant skirmish, they failed to decide which movie
they will see but still agreed on going to cinema ({seeing a movie}). One day later be-
fore the weekend, the girl said: “I heard that Casino Royale was not that bad” (she gave
up her belief¬Casino Royale). A new agreement was formed accordingly ({seeing a movie,
Casino Royale}). We see that the new situation is a subgame of the old situation and
the previously reached agreement is a feasible deal of the subgame but the previously
reached agreement is not the agreement of the subgame.
The following result shows that UC is not compatible with the other two axioms
that are considered to be much more fundamental.
Observation 6 There is no bargaining solution over B2,L satisfying CR, Sym and UC.
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Proof: Consider a 2-person bargaining game B = ((ρ1, e1), (ρ2, e2)) described in the
language L in which p is one of the propositional variables. Assume that ρ1 and ρ2 are
the induced entrenchment measures by the procedure described in Appendix based on
the the initial assignments ρ1(>) = ρ1(p) = ρ2(>) = ρ2(¬p) = 1, ρ1(⊥) = ρ2(⊥) =
0 and e1 = e2 = 0. Then there are three possible deals inΩ(B): (∅, ∅), (Cn{p}, ∅) and
(∅, Cn{¬p}). According to Sym, only (∅, ∅) can be the solution (the satisfaction can-
not be both in 1). However, both ((ρ1, 0), (ρ2, 1)) and ((ρ1, 1), (ρ2, 0)) are subgames
of B. Since (∅, ∅) is a deal of these subgames, by UC, (∅, ∅) should be the solution
of the subgames. On the other hand these two subgames are all compatible. By CR,
(Cn{p}, ∅) and (∅, Cn{¬p}) is the solution of each subgame, respectively. This leads
to a contradiction. 
Interestingly , the following natural weakening of UC goes well with our axioms:
(BC) For any mutually comparable bargaining gamesB andB ′, ifB′ v B and f(B) ∈
Ω(B′), then f(B′) = f(B). (Balanced Contraction)
Observation 7 CR, Inv, Sym and MCM implies BC.
Proof: Notice that Lemma 3 implies that for any mutually comparable game B,
Fi(B) = {ϕ ∈ L : ρi(ϕ) > η} (15)
where η = min
D∈Ω(B)
max
i∈N
ρi(Di). Suppose that B′ v B and B′ is mutually compara-
ble. Since Ω(B′) ⊆ Ω(B), we have η′ = min
D∈Ω(B′)
max
i∈N
ρ′i(Di) ≥ min
D∈Ω(B)
max
i∈N
ρi(Di)
= η. However, if F (B) ∈ Ω(B′), then we must have η′ = η. Since for each i, η′ ≥ ei.
According to Theorem 1, we have F (B′) = F (B). Thus f(B′) = f(B). 
It is easy to see that BC is the counterpart of Roth’s Independence of Alternative
Other Than the Disagreement Point and Ideal Point, which is satisfied by the KS-
solution (see [6] page 107).
4.6 The Nash bargaining solution
The result shown in above subsection seemingly suggests that the Nash bargaining so-
lution is no longer the most desirable solution if we represent a bargaining situation in
logic. In fact, this is not true. A bargaining solution is excessive sensitive to the choice
of domain (see [38] p. 46). The Nash bargaining solution is built up on the assumption
that the bargaining situations are represented in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
that are derived from preferences over lotteries which satisfy the expected utility as-
sumptions [39]. Zhang in [25] has shown that if we allow to play lotteries over possible
deals, the Nash solution can be extended to the logically represented domain of prob-
lems. However, if we do not allow to randomize the feasible sets, the Nash solution is
not necessarily the most intuitive solution.
Conley and Wilkie in [29] shows that with non-convex domain, the characterization
of the Nash solution requires a significant change on IIA. Conley and Wilkie introduce
the following assumption as the replacement of IIA in conjunction with continuity:
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– Ethical Monotonicity (E.Mon): If S ′ ⊆ S, d′ = d, and Ef (S, d) ∈ conh(S′), then
f(S′, d) ≤ f(S, d), where Ef (S, d) = f(conh(S), d).
It is easy to see that E. Mon is much less intuitive than IIA. Mariotti in [31] improves
Conley and Wilkie’s result by dropping continuity and weakening IIA. Nonetheless, the
resulting axiomatization is still not as intuitive as the original Nash’s system and much
less natural than the axioms for the KS-solution.
It is worth mentioning that if we allow multi-valued solutions, the characteriza-
tion can be much less complicated. Kaneko [40], Conley and Wilkie [29], Zhou [41],
Mariotti [38], Xu and Yoshihara [37] have shown that the original Nash’s axiomatiza-
tion can be mostly retained if we allow multi-valued or set-valued solutions when the
domain of problems is non-convex. These results shed some light on the further exten-
sion of the Nash bargaining solution to the logically represented domain of problems.
Nevertheless, multi-valued solutions or set-valued solution is not always an option for
computing-related applications due to the following reasons:
– For most AI-related applications, a single-valued solution is essential, especially
for the implementation of automated negotiation systems, which requires a single
solution as the output. In such a case, the intuitive axioms lead to the KS-solution.
– If multi-valued or set-valued solutions are allowed, the objections of randomizing
possible deals become weak.
– The maxmin rule is one of the most general criteria for decision-making that have
been widely used in AI-related applications. However, the applicability of the max-
imization of the product of utilities heavily relies on the utility representation and
its semantics.
In such a sense, the KS-solution is the most preferable option for AI-related appli-
cations.
5 The wage negotiation example
In this section, we examine our solution by using the introductory example we presented
in Section 1. To gain a better understanding of the methodology we use in the analysis,
we first simplify the example by temporally ignoring the strike-related conflicts and
concentrating on the conflict about wage raise and unemployment.
Figure 3 depicts a special situation whereby the conflict arises due to the union’s
demand of wage raise and the management’s threat of laying off employees.
As it is shown in the diagram, the initial assignment of the entrenchment measures
of the parties is the following:
Union Management
ρu(>) = 1.0; ρm(>) = 1.0;
ρu(jobs) = 0.9; ρm(raise → layoff ) = 0.7;
ρu(layoff → ¬jobs) = 0.7; ρm(⊥) = 0.0.
ρu(raise) = 0.6;
ρu(⊥) = 0.0.
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 layoff        jobs layoffraise
Fig. 3. A special situation of wage negotiation.
The conflict between the negotiation parties can be easily identified as follows:
{raise, raise→layoff, layoff→ ¬jobs, jobs} ` ⊥.
Since the union considers that the members jobs are more important than a wage
raise, meanwhile the management’s determination of laying off employees is relatively
high ( ρm(raise → layoff ) > ρu(raise)), the union will probably lose the negotiation.
There is only one maxmin solution among 14 possible deals in this situation, which is
(see the shaded part in the diagram):
(Cn{jobs, layoff → ¬jobs}, Cn{raise→ layoff})
The corresponding satisfaction for the union and the management is (0.4, 1.0), re-
spectively. The situation leads to a lose-win outcome, where the management is the
winner because its threat has taken effect.
Figure 4 shows two different variations of situation (a). Situation (b) is the same as
true
jobs
raise
Union Management
false false
true
(b)
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1.0
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(c)
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0.2
 layoff        jobs
layoffraise
Fig. 4. Two other special situations of wage negotiation.
(a) except that the management is slightly less certain on the necessity and feasibility
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of laying off employees but still entrenches it as firmly as the union entrenches its
appeal. In this situation there are two efficient maxmin solutions: (Cn{jobs, layoff →
¬jobs, raise}, Cn{>}) and (Cn{layoff → ¬jobs, jobs},
Cn{raise → layoff}). The modest maxmin solution is:
(Cn{layoff → ¬jobs, jobs}, Cn{>}).
The outcome is a “lose-lose” situation in which the union fails its appeal and the
weakness of the firm is exposed (because its threat is not included in the agreement).
The corresponding satisfaction for each party is (0.4, 0.4). However, if the manage-
ment’s determination of the layoff is even weaker, say ρm(raise → layoff ) = 0.5,
the negotiation will lead to a “win-lose” outcome (the management gives up before the
union does).
Figure 4 (c) describes a “win-win” situation in which the union considers the job
market is not that bad, so it gains more negotiation power than in situation (a). In this
case, the agreement is:
(Cn{jobs, raise}, Cn{raise → layoff}).
The union wins the negotiation, notwithstanding some union members would have
to faced up with finding other job opportunities. Note that the satisfaction for each party
in this situation is (0.4, 1.0), which is exactly the same as in situation (a). In this sense,
we cannot differentiate these two situations with the game-theoretic model.
Finally we consider a more complicated situation in which all the negotiation items
and threats described in Example 1 are taken into account.
true
jobs
raise
Union Management
false false
true
raise
raise strike raise layoff
production
 layoff        jobs
productionstrike
1.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Fig. 5. A tit-for-tat situation of wage negotiation.
Figure 5 shows a tit-for-tat bargaining situation in which both sides insists on their
demands in the same entrenchment degree. The situation leads to two efficient maxmin
solutions among 32 different deals: (Cn{jobs, layoff→¬jobs,¬raise→stike, raise}, Cn{production,
strike→¬production}) and (Cn{jobs, layoff→¬jobs},
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Cn{production, strike→¬production, raise→ layoff ,¬raise}). The modest maxmin
solution is:
(Cn{jobs, layoff→¬jobs}, Cn{production, strike→¬production})
None of the parties is completely satisfied with the outcome but the outcome gives them
the same degree of satisfaction (0.4, 0.4).
We might have noticed through the example that the logical model of bargaining
offers a different approach of bargaining analysis from the traditional game-theoretic
method. The approach allows us to vary a problem with different situations to iden-
tify the conflicts among the negotiation parties and to resolve the conflicts through
both logical and numerical reasoning. We have seen that the situation (a) and (c) in
the example have the same numerical mapping comp{(1.0, 0.3), (0.4, 1.0)} but result
in totally different outcomes. The situation (b) corresponds to a symmetric numerical
game comp{(1.0, 0.4), (0.4, 1.0)}, whereas the situation and its outcome is not sym-
metric at all. The refinement of bargaining modeling discloses the roles of various key
factors on the bargaining outcome, which is fundamental to the development of an un-
derstanding of bargaining reasoning and to the determination of the sources of players’
bargaining power10. In addition, the example also illustrates that bargaining reasoning is
non-monotonic (see, for instance, [43]). The threats¬raise → strike and raise → layoff
plays a role as soft rules in the determination of bargaining solution. The interleaving
ordering of these rules determines which rules we should use in the inference.
6 Related work
This work draws heavily on three different research areas: cooperative models of bar-
gaining in game theory, belief revision in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automated
negotiation in mutliagent systems. Some ideas are inspired by the author and his col-
leagues’ previous work [44,45,46,26,22,25,42,47]. In this subsection, we briefly sum-
marize the related work in these researches.
6.1 Cooperative model of bargaining in game theory
Although logical reasoning is not a major concern in game theory11, the game-theoretic
bargaining theory has a profound influence on the present work. The bargaining solution
we have proposed in this paper is basically a logical version of Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in terms of the numerical mapping of logically represented bargaining games
(see Observation 3). Therefore there are some similarities between our results and the
10 Computational issues could arise due to the refinement of the analysis. We leave these issues
for the future research. The reader is referred to Zhang and Zhang [42] for some preliminary
investigations on the computational model and computational complexity analysis of logic-
based bargaining solutions.
11 It is worth mentioning that a few pieces of work have been done in game theory that apply
logical approach to the analysis of economic phenomena (see [48]).
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KS-solution as well as its non-convex extensions, such as Herrero (1989), Conley and
Wilkie (1991), Hougaard and Tvede (2003), and Xu and Yoshihara (2006).
Herrero in [49] presented an extension of KS-solution to non-convex 2-person bar-
gaining problems. Her solution is set-valued and the characterisation of the solution
requires lower semi-continuity and a variation of IIA. Hougaard and Tvede in [30] re-
fined the result by eliminating the requirement of continuity and extending the domain
to n-person games. Xu and Yoshihara in [37] also present a characterization of the set-
valued KS-solution with comprehensive but non-convex domain of problems. Different
from these results, our axiomatization for multi-valued solutions is more concise, which
does not require symmetry.
Conley and Wilkie proposed and characterized an extension of single-valued KS-
solution to n-person no-nconvex bargaining problems. The axioms used are equivalent
to those used by Kalai and Smorodinsky in [3] except that PO is replaced by WPO.
We remark that although some of our axioms are inspired by the game-theoretic
axioms, not all axioms and assumptions in our framework have game-theoretic coun-
terparts. In our model, a bargaining situation is specified in terms of players’ bargaining
items and their preferences over the items. The feasible set is generated through a con-
flict resolving mechanism. The game-theoretic model, on the other hand, abstracts a bar-
gaining situation in a higher level that the feasible set is assumed to be given, where con-
flicts of negotiation items have been resolved. Therefore, there are no game-theoretic
axioms that correspond to Consistency and Collective Rationality. Even though the ax-
ioms, such as Scale Invariance, Pareto Optimality and Weakly Pareto Optimality, are
clear analogue of the related game-theory axioms, they are by no means equivalent to
their counterpart. In fact, most of our axioms and assumptions are weaker than their
game-theoretic counterparts in the sense that we cannot arbitrarily generate a numerical
domain with particular mathematical properties, say {x ∈ <n : Σxi ≤ n}, because it
may lose its connection to the original logical representation. Observation 5 has clearly
shown the difference between our axioms and their game-theoretic counterparts. More
importantly, our axiomatization is much more natural and intuitive than game-theoretic
axiomatization.
6.2 Belief revision
Belief revision is a theory dealing with the problem of belief conflicting. Much of the re-
search in the field is based on the work of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (1985
[33]), which has been widely referred to as the AGM theory. An axiomatic characteri-
zation of belief revision operations is developed in the AGM theory. The assumptions
IR, Con, and CR in this work are inspired by the AGM’s postulates [21]. The concept
of entrenchment measure is also developed based on the notion of epistemic entrench-
ment in belief revision as the name suggests [24]. The difference between them is that
an epistemic entrenchment ordering ranks logical statements in pre-order while an en-
trenchment measure maps a sentence to a real number. As we have mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.1, the notion of comprehensiveness comes from the idea of cut revision [27,28],
in which whenever a revision of belief state is carried out, the sentences that are given
up are those having the lowest degrees of epistemic entrenchment.
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Recently, the AGM theory has been applied to model mutual belief revision, be-
lief merging, information fusion and belief arbitration [34,44,50,51,22]. The work on
belief merging, information fusion and arbitration uses IR, Con, and CR as part of
axiomatization [34,51,50]. However, the basic tenet of that work diverges from negoti-
ation in the sense that belief merging maximizes the contributions from different infor-
mation resources (preserving consistency) while negotiation requires a “fair outcome”
that balances players’ gains. Therefore their axiomatic characterizations are different.
The work on mutual belief revision and the belief-revision-based model of negotia-
tion specify the generic logical properties of multiagent belief revision and negotia-
tion [44,46,45,22,42]. Opposite to the game theoretic approach, that work is limited
to purely qualitative analysis, therefore the information about bargainers’ preferences
cannot be fully specified within that framework.
6.3 Automated negotiation
There has been increasing interest in recent years in automated negotiation [12,8,16,10,11].
Game-theoretic approach has been successfully applied to the modeling and evalua-
tion of interaction and cooperation among autonomous agents [10]. Logical approach
has been also taken into account in negotiation and bargaining agent modeling. The
most influential work in this research is the argumentation-based framework of nego-
tiation [16,14,17]. Kraus et al has proposed a logical model specifying the procedure
of argumentation. The framework enables explicit representation of negotiation items,
promises, threats and more importantly, arguments (negotiating communications) by
using BDI logic. However, the focus of that work is on the representation of negotiation
procedures and communications between negotiating agents rather than the character-
istics of bargaining situations. Therefore the motivations and conclusions are different
from the present work. It is worth mentioning that we do not model agent’s goals, de-
sires and intentions not only because we try to achieve simple and clear-cut exploration
but also a cooperative model of bargaining does not need to model bargaining proce-
dures. Therefore the actions driven by agent’s goals, desires and intentions are not the
major concern of our framework.
Zhang in [25] has proposed a logical model of the Nash solution by representing
bargaining situations in propositional logic. Although the Nash solution and its char-
acterization are retained in his framework, logical reasoning is not clearly identified
through the characterization. This is due to the use of lotteries over possible agree-
ments, which causes the logically represented possible agreements being completely
quantified. Therefore the bargaining solution relies on the numerical representation.
More precisely, the outcome of bargaining is represented in a form with the combi-
national of probabilities and logical statements. The current work does not allow to
randomize possible deals. Thus the outcome of bargaining can be purely represented in
logical language. Since the Nash solution is not the theme of this work, that framework
can be viewed as a complement of the current work.
Zhang and Zhang in [42,47] present a computational model for the belief-revision-
based negotiation model. They also use the maxmin rule to construct bargaining solu-
tions. Different from the present work, that work is based on strategic model of bar-
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gaining in non-cooperative environment. However, that work shed light on the compu-
tational properties of logic-based bargaining solutions.
7 Conclusion and discussion
We have defined and characterized a logical solution to n-person bargaining problems.
We express a bargaining situation in propositional logic with numerical representation
of bargainers’ preferences. The bargaining solution is constructed based on the idea
of balancing and maximizing bargainers’ satisfaction by applying the maxmin rule
to possible deals. We have shown that the solution is uniquely characterized by four
axioms: collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry and mutually comparable
monotonicity in conjunction with three other fundamental assumptions: individual ra-
tionality, consistency and comprehensiveness. We characterize the Pareto efficient so-
lutions by the axioms scale invariance, Pareto optimality and restricted mutually com-
parable monotonicity along with the basic assumptions.
The axiomatization specifies two basic elements of bargaining reasoning: resolution
of conflicts and impartiality of bargains. The purely logical axioms individual rational-
ity, consistency and collective rationality models the reasoning of conflict resolving.
The axioms with game-theoretic counterparts, such as scale invariance, symmetry and
mutually comparable monotonicity, are used for balancing and maximizing the bargain-
ers’ gains (satisfaction) from the ultimate bargains. It is not surprising that these two sets
of axioms can deal with each of the problems separately because all the purely logical
axioms are sourced from belief revision, a formalism of conflict resolving, and the rest
of axioms have deep roots in game theory. However, it is surprising that these two sets
of axioms cooperate each other very well that we cannot see any gap between them.
We have shown that none of them can stand alone in the characterization. The whole
axiomatization is natural and intuitive, which clearly exhibits a coherent combination
of the logical (so qualitative) and quantitative characteristics of bargaining reasoning.
The ultimate goal of the work is to offer a new methodology of bargaining analysis
with logical reasoning. However, the logical theory of bargaining is not a rival of the
game-theoretic bargaining theory. We view them as complementary. The game-theoretic
approach has certainly an advantage to the continuous domain of problems. The logi-
cal theory is basically designed for the discrete domains even though any continuous
problem can be discretized and represented in logical language theoretically.
As Rubinstein points out, “the language of utility allows the use of geometrical
presentations and facilitates analysis; in contrast, the numerical presentation results
in an unnatural statement of the axioms and the solutions ([52] p.85). The language
of logic offers a different level of abstraction on bargaining situations, which allows
an explicit representation of bargaining items and a natural modeling of bargaining
reasoning. More importantly, the switch to the logical language leads to a new method-
ology of bargaining analysis. As we have shown in Section 5, a “horizontal” analysis
of different situations under one physical bargaining problem can be conducted, which
differentiates itself from the classical game-theoretic approach.
It is clear-cut from the AI perspective that the logical framework of bargaining pro-
vides a foundation for the implementation of intelligent negotiating agents with rea-
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soning components. It also makes it possible to incorporate other AI approaches, such
BDI logic[53], defeasible logic[54], belief revision and belief merging, into automated
negotiation systems. We can also perceive that the modeling of bargaining reasoning
would facilitate more comprehensive analysis of human interactions, therefore would
broaden the applications of bargaining theory that already exist in the fields of sociol-
ogy, politics, economics as well as computer science.
Appendix: Completion of entrenchment measure
In this appendix, we present a supplementary result which shows that any partial en-
trenchment ranking on a non-empty subsect of L can be extended to an entrenchment
measure on the whole language.
As we have mentioned earlier, beliefs are private information. A player may not
know the other players’ beliefs, therefore it is impractical to assume that each player has
an entrenchment measure over the whole underlying language. However, each player
must have a personal preferences on her own negotiation items. We can then assume
that each player submits a partial entrenchment measure on her negotiation items to
an arbitrator. The arbitrator extends the partial entrenchment measure for each player
to the whole language based on the assumption that if an item is not specified in the
partial entrenchment measure, the least value is assigned to the item as long as the
overall function satisfies LR. For instance, if ρ(p) = r, we can simply assume ρ(p ∨
q) = r unless a higher value has been assigned to p ∨ q in the partial entrenchment
measure (with LR, we always have ρ(p) ≤ ρ(p∨q) for any q). The following procedure
implements the idea.
Let X be any non-empty subset of L. Suppose that ρ is a function that maps X
to real numbers satisfying LR (see Definition 1). We shall extend the function to an
entrenchment measure ρˆ on the languageL so that ρˆ preserves the values of ρ onX and
satisfies LR.
Firstly, we construct a hierarchy, {X i}+∞i=1 , of X as follows:
1. T 0 = X ;
2. For k ≥ 0,
Xk+1 = {ϕ ∈ T k : ρ(ϕ) = max
ψ∈Tk
ρ(ψ)};
T k+1 = T k\Xk+1.
Secondly, we extend the hierarchy of X to a hierarchy, {X¯ i}+∞i=1 , of Cn(X) with
the following procedure:
1. X¯1 = Cn(X1).
2. X¯k+1 = Cn(
k+1⋃
i=1
X i)\
k⋃
i=1
X¯ i for k > 0.
Finally, we define a function ρ¯ from L to < as follows:
1. for each ϕ ∈ X¯k, ρ¯(ϕ) = ρ(ψ) for some ψ ∈ Xk;
2. for each ϕ ∈ L\Cn(X), ρ¯(ϕ) = min{ρ(ψ) : ψ ∈ X} − 1.
Dagstuhl Seminar-07351–Discussion Paper 31
Note that we could assume that each player gives a value to⊥, indicating the lowest
degree to the least entrenched item. In this case we have⊥ ∈ X , hence Cn(X) = L. If
it is not the case, the arbitrator creates a lowest degree for the player as shown in above
case 2.
Observation 8 ρ¯ defined above is an entrenchment measure. Moreover, ρ¯ is a conser-
vative extension of ρ that preserves the values of ρ over X , that is, for any ϕ ∈ X ,
ρ¯(ϕ) = ρ(ϕ).
Proof: According to LR, all logically equivalent statements have the same degree of
entrenchment. Therefore both the hierarchies {X i}+∞i=1 and {X¯ i}
+∞
i=1 are well defined.
In fact, there are a numberM such that X =
M⋃
i=1
X i and Cn(X) =
M⋃
i=1
X¯ i. It is easy to
see that for any ϕ ∈ X i and ψ ∈ Xj , i < j implies ρ(ϕ) > ρ(ψ). The similar assertion
is also true for ρ¯.
Now we prove that ρ¯ is an entrenchment measure, that is, ρ¯ satisfies LR. Suppose
that ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ` ϕ. Let r = min{ρ¯(ϕ1), · · · , ρ¯(ϕm)}. If r = min{ρ(ψ) : ψ ∈
X} − 1, according to the definition of ρ¯, we always have ρ¯(ϕ) ≥ r. If r > min{ρ(ψ) :
ψ ∈ X} − 1, then we know ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ∈ Cn(X). It follows that there is a number
i0 such that ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ∈
i0⋃
i=1
X¯ i and r = ρ(ψ) for some ψ ∈ X i0 . Since
i0⋃
i=1
X¯ i =
Cn(
i0⋃
i=1
X i), it follows that ϕ ∈
i0⋃
i=1
X¯ i. We then have ρ¯(ϕ) ≥ ρ(ψ) = r.
Finally, we prove that ρ¯ is a conservative extension of ρ. It is sufficient to show that
for each k, Xk ⊆ X¯k. Obviously, X1 ⊆ X¯1. Assume that for all i ≤ k, X i ⊆ X¯ i.
We prove that Xk+1 ⊆ X¯k+1. If it is not true, then Xk+1 ∩
k⋃
i=1
X¯ i 6= ∅. It turns out
that there exists ϕ ∈ Xk+1 such that ϕ ∈
k⋃
i=1
X¯ i. Thus there is i0 ≤ k such that
ϕ ∈ X¯ i0 , or, ϕ ∈ Cn(
i0⋃
i=1
X i). It follows that there are ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ∈
i0⋃
i=1
X i such
that ϕ1, · · · , ϕm ` ϕ. By LR, min{ρ(ϕ1), · · · , ρ(ϕm)} ≤ ρ(ϕ). According to the
construction of the hierarchy {X i}+∞i=1 , it is not hard to show that ϕ ∈
i0⋃
i=1
X i, which
contradicts the fact that ϕ ∈ Xk+1. ThereforeXk+1 ⊆ X¯k+1, as desired. 
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